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Abstract 
 
Terms like "Science of Cyber" or "Cyber Science" have been appearing in literature with 
growing frequency, and influential organizations initiated research initiatives toward 
developing such a science even though it is not clearly defined. We propose to define 
the domain of the science of cyber security by noting the most salient artifact within 
cyber security -- malicious software -- and defining the domain as comprised of 
phenomena that involve malicious software (as well as legitimate software and 
protocols used maliciously) used to compel a computing device or a network of 
computing devices to perform actions desired by the perpetrator of malicious software 
(the attacker) and generally contrary to the intent (the policy) of the legitimate owner or 
operator (the defender) of the computing device(s). We further define the science of 
cyber security as the study of relations – preferably expressed as theoretically-grounded 
models -- between attributes, structures and dynamics of: violations of cyber security 
policy; the network of computing devices under attack; the defenders' tools and 
techniques; and the attackers' tools and techniques where malicious software plays the 
central role. We offer a simple formalism of these key objects within cyber science and 
systematically derive a classification of primary problem classes within cyber science.  
 
Introduction 
 
Few things are more suspect than a claim of the birth of a new science. Yet, in the last 
few years, terms like "Science of Cyber," or "Science of Cyber Security," or "Cyber 
Science" have been appearing in use with growing frequency. For example, the US 
Department of Defense defined “Cyber Science” as a high priority for its science and 
technology investments (Lemnios 2011), and the National Security Agency has been 
exploring the nature of the “science of cybersecurity” in its publications, e.g., (Longstaff 
2012). This interest in science of cyber is motivated by the recognition that development 
of cyber technologies is handicapped by the lack of scientific understanding of the cyber 
phenomena, particularly the fundamental laws, theories, and theoretically-grounded and 
empirically validated models (JASON 2010). Lack of such fundamental knowledge – 
and its importance – has been highlighted by the US President’s National Science and 
Technology Council (NSTC 2011) using the term “cybersecurity science.” 
 
Still, even for those in the cyber security community who agree with the need for 
science of cyber -- whether it merits an exalted title of a new science or should be seen 
merely as a distinct field of research within one or more of established sciences -- the 
exact nature of the new science, its scope and boundaries remain rather unclear. 
 
This chapter offers an approach to describing this scope in a semi-formal fashion, with 
special attention to identifying and characterizing the classes of problems that the 
science of cyber should address. In effect, we will map out the landscape of the science 
of cyber as a coherent classification of its characteristic problems. Examples of current 
research -- mainly taken from the portfolio of the United States Army Research 
Laboratory where the author works -- will illustrate selected classes of problems within 
this landscape. 
 
Defining the Science of Cyber Security 
A research field -- whether or not we declare it a distinct new science -- should be 
characterized from at least two perspectives. First is the domain or objects of study, i.e., 
the classes of entities and phenomena that are being studied in this research field. 
Second is the set of characteristic problems, the types of questions that are asked 
about the objects of study. Related examples of attempts to define a field of research 
include (Willis 20000) and (Bostrom 2007). 
To define the domain of the science of cyber security, let's focus on the most salient 
artifact within cyber security -- malicious software. This leads us to the following 
definition: the domain of science of cyber security is comprised of phenomena that 
involve malicious software (as well as legitimate software and protocols used 
maliciously) used to compel a computing device or a network of computing devices to 
perform actions desired by the perpetrator of malicious software (the attacker) and 
generally contrary to the intent (the policy) of the legitimate owner or operator (the 
defender) of the computing device(s). In other words, the objects of research in cyber 
security are: 
 Attacker A along with the attacker's tools (especially malware) and tech-
niques Ta 
 Defender D along with the defender’s defensive tools and techniques Td, 
and operational assets, networks and systems Nd 
 Policy P, a set of defender's assertions or requirements about what event 
should and should not happen. To simplify, we may focus on cyber inci-
dents I: events that should not happen.  
Note that this definition of relevant domain helps to answer common questions about 
the relations between cyber security and established fields like electronic warfare and 
cryptology. Neither electronic warfare nor cryptology focus on malware and processes 
pertaining to malware as the primary objects of study. 
The second aspect of the definition is the types of questions that researchers ask about 
the objects of study. Given the objects of cyber security we proposed above, the primary 
questions revolve around the relations between Ta, Td, Nd, and I (somewhat similar 
perspective is suggested in (Schneider 2012) and in (Bau and Mitchell 2011). A 
shorthand for the totality of such relations might be stated as 
(I, Td, Nd, Ta) = 0 (1) 
This equation does not mean I expect to see a fundamental equation of this form. It is 
merely a shorthand that reflects our expectation that cyber incidents (i.e., violations of 
cyber security policy) depend on attributes, structures and dynamics of the network of 
computing devices under attack, and the tools and techniques of defenders and 
attackers. 
 
Let us now summarize what we discussed so far in the following definition. The science 
of cyber security is the study of relations between attributes, structures and dynamics 
of: violations of cyber security policy; the network of computing devices under attack; 
the defenders' tools and techniques; and the attackers' tools and techniques where 
malicious software plays the central role.  
 
A study of relations between properties of the study's objects finds its most tangible 
manifestation in models and theories. The central role of models in science is well 
recognized; it can be argued that a science is a collection of models (Frigg 2012), or 
that a scientific theory is a family of models or a generalized schema for models 
(Cartwright 1983, Suppes 2002). From this perspective, we can restate our definition of 
science of cyber security as follows. The science of cyber security develops a coherent 
family of models of relations between attributes, structures and dynamics of: violations 
of cyber security policy; the network of computing devices under attack; the defenders' 
tools and techniques; and the attackers' tools and techniques where malicious software 
plays the central role. Such models 
1. are expressed in an appropriate rigorous formalism;  
2. explicitly specify assumptions, simplifications and constraints;  
3. involve characteristics of threats, defensive mechanisms and the defended 
network;  
4. are at least partly theoretically grounded;  
5. yield experimentally testable predictions of characteristics of security 
violations. 
 
There is a close correspondence between a class of problems and the models that help 
solve the problem. The ensuing sections of this chapter look at specific classes of 
problems of cyber security and the corresponding classes of models. We find that Eq. 1 
provides a convenient basis for deriving an exhaustive set of such problems and models 
in a systematic fashion. 
Development of Intrusion Detection Tools 
 
Intrusion detection is one of the most common subjects of research literature generally 
recognized as falling into the realm of cyber security. Much of research in intrusion 
detection focuses on proposing novel algorithms and architectures of intrusion detection 
tools. A related topic is characterization of efficacy of such tools, e.g., the rate of 
detecting true intrusions or the false alert rate of a proposed tool or algorithm in 
comparison with prior art. 
 
To generalize, the problem addressed by this literature is to find (also, to derive or 
synthesize) an algorithmic process , or technique, or architecture of defensive tool that 
detects certain types of malicious activities, with given assumptions (often implicit) 
about the nature of computing devices and network being attacked, about the defensive 
policies (e.g., a requirement for rapid and complete identification of intrusions or 
information exfiltration, with high probability of success), and about the general intent 
and approaches of the attacker. More formally, in this problem we seek to derive Td from 
Nd, Ta, and I, i.e.,      
 
Nd, Ta, I → Td   (2) 
 
Recall that Td refers to a general description of defenders' tools and techniques, that 
may include an algorithmic process or rules of an intrusion detection tool, as well as 
architecture of an IDS or IPS, and attributes of an IDS such as its detection rate. In 
other words, Eq. 2 is shorthand for a broad class of problems. Also note that Eq. 2 is 
derived from Eq. 1 by focusing on one of the terms on the left hand side of Eq. 1.  
 
To illustrate the breadth of issues included this class of problems, let's consider an 
example – a research effort conducted at the US Army Research Laboratory that seeks 
architectures and approaches to detection of intrusions in a wireless mobile network 
(Ge et al. 2012). In this research, we make an assumption that the intrusions are of a 
sophisticated nature and are unlikely to be detected by a signature-matching or 
anomaly-based algorithm. Instead, it requires a comprehensive analysis and correlation 
of information obtained from multiple devices operating on the network, performed by a 
comprehensive collection of diverse tools and by an insightful human analysis. 
 
One architectural approach to meeting such requirements would comprise multiple 
software agents deployed on all or most of the computing devices of the wireless 
network; the agents would send their observations of the network traffic and of host-
based activities to a central analysis facility; and the central analysis facility would 
perform a comprehensive processing and correlation of this information, with 
participation of a competent human analyst.  
 
 
 
Fig.1. Local agents on the hosts of the mobile network collect and sample information 
about host-based and network events; this information is aggregated and transmitted to 
the operation center where comprehensive analysis and detection are performed. 
Adapted from (Ge et. al. 2012) with permission. 
 
 
Such an approach raises a number of complex research issues. For example, because 
the bandwidth of the wireless network is limited by a number of factors, it is desirable to 
use appropriate sampling and in-network aggregation and pre-processing of information 
produced by the local software agents before transmitting all this information to the 
central facility. Techniques to determine appropriate locations for such intermediate 
aggregation and processing are needed. Also needed are algorithms for performing 
aggregation and pre-processing that maximize the likelihood of preserving the critical 
information indicating an intrusion.  We also wish to have means to characterize the 
resulting detection accuracy in this bandwidth-restricted, mobile environment. 
 
  
Fig. 2. Experiments suggest that detection rates and error rate of detection strongly 
depend on the traffic sampling ratio as well as the specific strategy of sampling. 
Adapted from (Ge et al 2012) with permission. 
 
Eq.2 captures key elements of this class of problems. E.g., Td in Eq.2 is the abstraction 
of this defensive tool's structure (e.g., locations of interim processing points), behavior 
(e.g., algorithms for pre-processing), and attributes (e.g., detection rate). Designers of 
such a tool would benefit from a model that predicts the efficacy of the intrusion 
detection process as a function of architectural decisions, properties of the algorithms 
and properties of the anticipated attacker's tools and techniques. 
Cyber Maneuver and Moving Target Defense 
 
Cyber maneuver refers to the process of actively changing the defended network -- its 
topology, allocation of functions and properties (Jajodia et al. 2011). Such changes can 
be useful for several reasons. Continuous changes help to confuse the attacker and to 
reduce the attacker's ability to conduct effective reconnaissance of the network in 
preparation for an attack. This use of cyber maneuver is also called moving target 
defense. Other types of cyber maneuver could be used to minimize effects of an 
ongoing attack, to control damage, or to restore the network's operations after an attack. 
 
Specific approaches to cyber maneuver and moving target defense, such as 
randomization and enumeration are discussed in (Jajodia et al. 2011, Jajodia et al. 
2013). Randomization can take multiple forms: memory address space layout, (e.g., 
(Bojinov 2011]); instruction set (Barrantes 2005, Boyd 2010); compiler-generated 
software diversity; encryption; network address and layout; service locations, traffic 
patterns; task replication and breakdown across cores or machines; access policies; 
virtualization; obfuscation of OS types and services; randomized and multi-path routing, 
and others. Moving Target Defense has been identified as one of four strategic thrusts 
in the strategic plan for cyber security developed by the National Science and 
Technology Council (NSTC 2011).  
 
Depending on its purpose, the cyber maneuver involves a large number of changes to 
the network executed by the network's defenders rapidly and potentially continuously 
over a long period of time. The defender’s challenge is to plan this complex sequence of 
actions and to control its execution in such a way that the maneuver achieves its goals 
without destabilizing the network or confusing its users; a challenge that has been 
extensively explored but not necessarily solved in AI planning literature, e.g., (Sadeh 
and Kott 1996; Kott 2006). 
 
Until now, we used Td to denote the totality of attributes, structure and dynamics of the 
defender's tools and techniques. Let's introduce additional notation, where STd is the 
structure of the defensive tools, and BTd(t) is the defender's actions. Then, referring to 
Eq. 1 and focusing on BTd -- the sub-element of Td, the class of problems related to 
synthesis and control of defenders course of action can be described as 
 
Nd, Ta, I → BTd(t)   (3) 
 
An example of problem in this class is to design a technique of cyber maneuver in a 
mobile ad hoc spread-spectrum network where some of the nodes are compromised via 
a cyber attack and become adversary-controlled jammers of the network's 
communications. One approach is to execute a cyber maneuver using spread-spectrum 
keys as maneuver keys (Torrieri, Zhu and Jajodia 2013).  Such keys supplement the 
higher-level network cryptographic keys and provide the means to resist and respond to 
external and insider attacks. The approach also includes components for attack 
detection, identification of compromised nodes, and group rekeying that excludes 
compromised nodes. 
 
 Fig. 3. In moving target defense, the network continually changes its attributes visible to 
the attacker, in order to minimize the attacker’s opportunities for planning and executing 
an effective attack. 
 
Eq. 3 captures the key features of the problem: we wish to derive the plan of cyber 
maneuver BTd(t) from known or estimated changes in properties of our network, 
properties of anticipated or actually observed attacks Ta, and the objective of minimizing 
security violations I. Planning and execution of a cyber maneuver would benefit from 
models that predict relevant properties of the maneuver, such as its convergence to a 
desired end state, stability, or reduction of observability to the attacker. 
Assessment of Network's Vulnerabilities and Risks 
 
Monitoring and assessment of vulnerabilities and risks is an important part of cyber 
security strategy pursued by the US Government (Dempsey et al. 2011) This involves 
continuous collection of data through automated feeds including  network traffic 
information as well as host information from host-based agents: vulnerability information 
and patch status about hosts on the network; scan results from tools like Nessus; TCP 
netflow data; DNS trees, etc.  These data undergo automated analysis in order to 
assess the risks. The assessment may include flagging especially egregious 
vulnerabilities and exposures, or computing metrics that provide an overall 
characterization of the network’s risk level. In current practice, risk metrics are often 
simple sums or counts of vulnerabilities and missing patches.  
 
There are important benefits in automated quantification of risk, i.e., of assigning risk 
scores or other numerical measures to the network as w hole, its subsets and even 
individual assets (Kott and Arnold 2013; Gil 2014). This opens doors to true risk 
management decision-making, potentially highly rigorous and insightful. Employees at 
multiple levels – from senior leaders to system administrators – will be aware of 
continually updated risk distribution over the network components, and will use this 
awareness to prioritize application of resources to most effective remedial actions. 
Quantification of risks can also contribute to rapid, automated or semi-automated 
implementation of remediation plans.  
 
However, existing risk scoring algorithms remain limited to ad hoc heuristics such as 
simple sums of vulnerability scores or counts of things like missing patches or open 
ports, etc.  Weaknesses and potentially misleading nature of such metrics have been 
pointed out by a number of specialists, e.g., (Jensen 2009; Bartol 2009). For example, 
the individual vulnerability scores are dangerously reliant on subjective, human, 
qualitative input, potentially inaccurate and expensive to obtain. Further, the total 
number of vulnerabilities may matters far less than how vulnerabilities are distributed 
over hosts, or over time. Similarly, neither topology of the network nor the roles and 
dynamics of inter-host interactions are considered by simple sums of vulnerabilities or 
missing patches. In general, there is a pronounced lack of rigorous theory and models 
of how various factors might combine into quantitative characterization of true risks, 
although there are initial efforts, such as (Lippman 2012) to formulate scientifically 
rigorous methods of calculating risks. 
 
Returning to Eq. 1 and specializing the problem to one of finding Nd, we obtain  
 
I, Td, Ta → Nd   (4) 
 
Recall that Nd refers to the totality of the defender’s network structure, behavior and 
properties. Therefore, Eq. 3 refers to a broad range of problems including those of 
synthesizing the design, the operational plans and the overall properties of the network 
we are to defend. Vulnerabilities, risk, robustness, resiliency and controllability of a 
network are all examples of the network’s properties, and Eq. 3 captures the problem of 
modeling and computing such properties. 
 
An example of research on the problem of developing models of properties of 
robustness, resilience, network control effectiveness, and collaboration in networks is 
(Cam 2012). The author explores approaches to characterizing the relative criticality of 
cyber assets by taking into account risk assessment (e.g., threats, vulnerabilities), 
multiple attributes (e.g., resilience, control, and influence), network connectivity and 
controllability among collaborative cyber assets in networks. In particular, the 
interactions between nodes of the network must be considered in assessing how 
vulnerable they are and what mutual defense mechanisms are available.   
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Risk assessment of a network must take into account complex interactions 
between nodes of the network, particularly the interactions between their vulnerabilities 
as well as opportunities for mutual defense. Adapted from (Hasan 2012 with permission. 
 
Attack Detection and Prediction 
 
Detection of malicious activities on networks is among the oldest and most common 
problems in cyber security (Anderson 1980). A broad subset of such problems is often 
called intrusion detection. Approaches to intrusion detection are usually divided into two 
classes, signature-based approaches and anomaly-based approach, both with their 
significant challenges (Axelsson 2000, Patcha and Park 2007). In Eq. 3, the term I 
refers to malicious activities or intrusions, including structures, behaviors and properties 
of such activities. Therefore, the process of determining whether a malicious activity is 
present and its timing, location and characteristics, are reflected in the following 
expression: 
 
Td, Nd, Ta → I   (5) 
 
The broad class of problems captured by Eq. 5 includes the problem of deriving key 
properties of a malicious activity, including the very fact of an existence of such an 
activity, from the available information about the tools and techniques of the attacker Ta 
(e.g., the estimated degree of sophistication and the nature of past attempted attacks of 
the likely threats), tools and techniques of the defender Td (e.g., locations and 
capabilities of the firewalls and intrusion-prevention systems), and the observed events 
on the defender’s network Nd (e.g., the alerts received from host based agents or 
network based intrusion detection systems).  
 
Among the formidable challenges of the detection problem is the fact that human 
analysts and their cognitive processes are critical components within the modern 
practices of intrusion detection. However, the human factors and their properties in 
cyber security have been inadequately studied and are poorly understood (McNeese 
2012, Boyce et al. 2011). 
 
Unlike the detection problem that focuses on identifying and characterizing malicious 
activities that have already happened or at least have been initiated, i.e., I(t) for t<tnow, 
the prediction problem seeks to characterize malicious activities that are to occur in the 
future, i.e., I(t) for t>tnow. The extent of research efforts and the resulting progress has 
been far less substantial in prediction than in detection, although related research has 
occurred in related adversarial domains, e.g., (Ownby and Kott 2006). Theoretically 
grounded models that predict characteristics of malicious activities I – including the 
property of  detectability of the activity -- as a function of Ta, Td, Na, would be major 
contributors into advancing this area of research. 
 
An example of research on identifying and characterizing probable malicious activities, 
with a predictive element as well, is (Harang and Glodek 2012), where the focus is on 
fraudulent use of security tokens for unauthorized access to network resources. Authors 
explore approaches to detecting such fraudulent access instances through a network-
based intrusion detection system that uses a parsimonious set of information. 
Specifically, they present an anomaly detection system based upon IP addresses, a 
mapping of geographic location as inferred from IP address, and usage timestamps. 
The anomaly detector is capable of identifying fraudulent token usage with as little as a 
single instance of fraudulent usage while overcoming the often significant limitations in 
geographic IP address mappings. This research finds significant advantages in a novel 
unsupervised learning approach to authenticating fraudulent access attempts via 
time/distance clustering on sparse data.  
 
 
 
Fig. 5. There exist multiple patterns of time-distance pairs of legitimate users’ 
subsequent log-ins. This figure depicts the pattern of single location users combined 
with typical commuters that log-in from more than one location. Adapted from (Harang 
and Glodek 2012) with permission. 
Threat Analysis and Cyber Wargaming 
 
Returning once more to Eq. 1, consider the class of problems where the tools and 
techniques of the attacker Ta are of primary interest: 
 
 
I, Td, Nd, → Ta   (6) 
 
Within this class of problems we see for example the problem of deriving structure, 
behavior and properties of malware from the examples of the malicious code or from 
partial observations of its malicious activities. Reverse engineering and malware 
analysis, including methods of detecting malware by observing a code’s structure and 
characteristics, fall into this class of problems.  
 
A special subclass of problems occurs when we focus on anticipating the behavior of 
attacker over time as a function of defender’s behavior: 
 
I(t), Td(t), Nd, → Ta(t)   (6a) 
 
 
In this problem, game considerations are important -- both the defender’s and the 
attacker’s actions are at least partially strategic and depend on their assumptions and 
anticipations of each other’s actions. Topics like adversarial analysis and reasoning, 
wargaming, anticipation of threat actions, and course of action development fall into this 
subclass of problems.  
Summary of the Cyber Science Problem Landscape 
 
We now summarize the classification of major problem groups in cyber security. All of 
these derive from Eq. 1. For each subclass, an example of a common problem in cyber 
security research and practice is added, for the sake of illustration. 
 
Td, Ta, I → Nd 
Td, Ta, I → SNd(t) – e.g., synthesis of network’s structure 
Td, Ta, I → BNd(t) – e.g., planning and anticipation of network’s behavior 
Td, Ta, I → PNd(t) – e.g., assessing and anticipating network’s security properties 
 
Nd, Ta, I → Td 
Nd, Ta, I → STd(t) – e.g., design of defensive tools, algorithms 
Nd, Ta, I → BTd(t) – e.g., planning and control of defender’s course of action 
Nd, Ta, I → PTd(t) – e.g., assessing and anticipating the efficacy of defense  
 
Td, Nd, I → Ta 
Td, Nd, I → STa(t) – e.g., identification of structure of attacker’s code or infrastructure 
Td, Nd, I → BTa(t) – e.g., discovery, anticipation and wargaming of attacker’ actions 
Td, Nd, I → PTa(t) – e.g., anticipating the efficacy of attacker’s actions  
 
Td, Nd, Ta → I 
Td, Nd, Ta → I(t), t<tnow – e.g., detection of intrusions that have occured 
Td, Nd, Ta → I(t), t>tnow – e.g., anticipation of intrusions that will occur 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
As a research field, the emerging science of cyber security can be defined as the 
search for a coherent family of models of relations between attributes, structures and 
dynamics of: violations of cyber security policy; the network of computing devices under 
attack; the defenders' tools and techniques; and the attackers' tools and techniques 
where malicious software plays the central role. As cyber science matures, it will see 
emergence of models that should: (a) be expressed in an appropriate rigorous 
formalism; (b) explicitly specify assumptions, simplifications and constraints; (c) involve 
characteristics of threats, defensive mechanisms and the defended network; (c) be at 
least partly theoretically grounded; and (d) yield experimentally testable predictions of 
characteristics of security violations. Such models are motivated by key problems in 
cyber security. We propose and systematically derive a classification of key problems in 
cyber security, and illustrate with examples of current research.  
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